



FH
[REDACTED]

**STATE OF WISCONSIN
Division of Hearings and Appeals**

In the Matter of

Office of the Inspector General,
Petitioner

DECISION

v.

FOF/152032

[REDACTED], Respondent

PRELIMINARY RECITALS

Pursuant to a petition filed September 11, 2013, under 7 C.F.R. § 273.16, to review a decision by the Office of the Inspector General to disqualify [REDACTED] from receiving FoodShare benefits (FS) for a period of one year, a hearing was held on November 12, 2013, by telephone.

The issue for determination is whether the respondent committed an Intentional Program Violation (IPV).

PARTIES IN INTEREST:

Petitioner:

Department of Health Services
Office of the Inspector General
1 West Wilson Street
Madison, Wisconsin 53703
By: Nadine Stankey

Respondent:

[REDACTED] (Did not appear)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:

Brian C. Schneider
Division of Hearings and Appeals

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The respondent (CARES# [REDACTED]) is a resident of Milwaukee County who received FS during the time period of May - October 2012.
2. During that period the respondent's FS card was used to make purchases at [REDACTED], a small corner store that since has been disqualified as an FS vendor due to trafficking violations.
3. [REDACTED] was disqualified for three specific bases that are tied to FS trafficking according to the USDA Food and Nutrition Services (FNS): (1) an unusual number of transactions ending in the

same cents value, (2) multiple transactions made by the same purchaser in unusually short time frames, and (3) excessively large purchase transactions. The store's only cash register was through a small opening in a security window and had no price scanner. There were no shopping baskets for customers to place multiple items that would add up to large purchase amounts. The store stocked minimal amounts of groceries, and had an emphasis on snack items. Customers reported that [REDACTED] allowed them to purchase non-food items using their FS cards.

4. On May 14, 2012, the respondent's card was used to make three purchases at [REDACTED]. All three had cents amounts ending in "0" or "5." At 11:04 that morning the respondent made a \$130.25 purchase at [REDACTED], and then less than an hour later he made a purchase at [REDACTED] for \$47.20. He made two later purchases that day at [REDACTED].
5. On October 7, 2013, the petitioner prepared an Administrative Disqualification Hearing Notice alleging that the respondent trafficked FS.
6. The respondent failed to appear for the scheduled November 12, 2013 IPV hearing and did not provide any good cause for said failure to appear.

DISCUSSION

An IPV is defined at 7 C.F.R. §273.16(c) as intentionally: making a false or misleading statement or misrepresenting; concealing or withholding facts; or committing any act that constitutes a violation of the Food Stamp Act, federal regulations or any Wisconsin statute relating to the use, presentation, transfer, acquisition, receipt or possession of food stamp coupons or an authorization to participate (ATP) card.

The Department's written policy restates federal law, below:

3.14.1 IPV Disqualification

7 CFR 273.16

A person commits an Intentional Program Violation (IPV) when s/he intentionally:

1. makes a false or misleading statement, or misrepresents, conceals or withholds facts; or
2. commits any act that constitutes a violation of the Food Stamp Act, the Food Stamp Program Regulations, or any Wisconsin statute for the purpose of using, presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, possessing or trafficking of FoodShare benefits or QUEST cards.

An IPV may be determined by a federal, state, or local court order, an Administrative Disqualification Hearing (ADH) decision, or a prehearing waiver.

FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook, §3.14.1. The agency may disqualify only the individual who either has been found to have committed the IPV or has signed a waiver or consent agreement, and not the entire household. If disqualified, an individual will be ineligible to participate in the FS program for one year for the first violation, two years for the second violation, and permanently for the third violation. However, any remaining household members must agree to make restitution within 30 days of the date of mailing a written demand letter, or their monthly allotment will be reduced. 7 C.F.R. §273.16(b).

7 C.F.R. §273.16(e)(4) provides that the hearing shall proceed if the respondent cannot be located or fails to appear without good cause.

In order for the county agency to establish that an FS recipient has committed an IPV, it has the burden to prove two separate elements by clear and convincing evidence. The recipient must have: 1) committed; and 2) intended to commit an intentional program violation per 7 C.F.R. §273.16(e)(6).

"Clear and convincing evidence" is an intermediate standard of proof which is more than the "preponderance of the evidence" used in most civil cases and less than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard used in criminal cases. It is used in civil cases where a higher standard is required because the outcome could result in serious social consequences for, or harsh effects on an individual. See 32A C.J.S., Evidence §1023. While the terminology for this intermediate standard of proof varies from state to state, it is clear that it is what is required by the FS regulations. See Jackson v. State, 546 So.2d 745 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1989).

The Wisconsin Supreme Court viewed the various standards of proof as degrees of certitude. In Kuehn v. Kuehn, 11 Wis.2d 15, 26 (1959), the court held that:

Defined in terms of quantity of proof, reasonable certitude or reasonable certainty in ordinary civil cases may be attained by or be based on a mere or fair preponderance of the evidence. Such certainty need not necessarily exclude the probability that the contrary conclusion may be true. In fraud cases it has been stated the preponderance of the evidence should be clear and satisfactory to indicate or sustain a greater degree of certitude. Such degree of certitude has also been defined as being produced by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Such evidence, however, need not eliminate a reasonable doubt that the alternative or opposite conclusion may be true. In criminal cases, while not normally stated in terms of preponderance, the necessary certitude is universally stated as being beyond a reasonable doubt.

Thus in order to find that an IPV was committed, the trier of fact must derive from the evidence, a firm conviction as to the existence of each of the two elements even though there may exist a reasonable doubt that the opposite is true.

In order to prove the second element, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient intended to commit the IPV. The question of intent is generally one to be determined by the trier of fact. State v. Lossman, 118 Wis.2d 526 (1984). There is a general rule that a person is presumed to know and intend the probable and natural consequences of his or her own voluntary words or acts. See John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck, 208 Wis. 650 (1932); 31A C.J.S. Evidence §131. Intention is a subjective state of mind to be determined upon all the facts. Lecus v. American Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston, 81 Wis.2d 183 (1977). Thus, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient knew that the act or omission was a violation of the FS Program but committed the violation anyway.

This is not a clear cut situation because there is no first hand evidence that the respondent engaged in trafficking, i.e. no witnesses saw him do so and neither he nor the [REDACTED] storekeepers admitted to the charges. However, it is inferred that the FNS did substantial research on trafficking activity and actions associated with trafficking. [REDACTED] was disqualified as an FS vendor for taking part in trafficking activities, and the respondent clearly took part in activities identified as trafficking.

The respondent did not make many purchases at [REDACTED]. However, when he did make purchases, they fit the profile perfectly. On May 15 he made three purchases there hours apart totaling \$65.95. The same day he spent \$130 at [REDACTED]. He spent his entire \$200 monthly FS allotment on that day, a suspicious circumstance for a homeless person. It is inexplicable why the respondent would make the [REDACTED] purchases when he spent \$130 at Sam's. I note that his routine continued. In June, 2012 he spent his entire \$200 at the same time at a place called Eddy's Food. Then in July, August, and September he spent

his entire \$200 the same day at a place called [REDACTED]. Again, what would a homeless person do with \$200 worth of food?

Perhaps the respondent could have explained the actions. However, he did not appear for this hearing, from which I draw an adverse inference as to his possible culpability. He has provided the Department with no credible explanation for his conduct. I conclude, therefore, that the respondent committed, and intended to commit, an FS IPV.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The respondent violated, and intended to violate, the FS program rule specifying that a recipient shall not traffic FS.
2. The violation specified in Conclusion of Law No. 1 is the first such violation committed by the respondent.

THEREFORE, it is

ORDERED

That the petitioner's determination is sustained, and that the petitioner may make a finding that the respondent committed a first IPV of the FoodShare program and disqualify the respondent from the program for one year, effective the first month following the date of receipt of this decision.

REQUEST FOR REHEARING ON GROUNDS OF GOOD CAUSE FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR

In instances where the good cause for failure to appear is based upon a showing of non-receipt of the hearing notice, the respondent has 30 days after the date of the written notice of the hearing decision to claim good cause for failure to appear. See 7 C.F.R. sec. 273.16(e)(4). Such a claim should be in writing to the Division of Hearings and Appeals, P.O. Box 7875, Madison, WI 53707-7875.

APPEAL TO COURT

You may also appeal this decision to Circuit Court in the county where you live. Appeals must be served and filed with the appropriate court no more than 30 days after the date of this hearing decision (or 30 days after a denial of rehearing, if you ask for one).

For purposes of appeal to circuit court, the Respondent in this matter is the Department of Health Services. After filing the appeal with the appropriate court, it must be served on the Secretary of that Department, either personally or by certified mail. The address of the Department is: 1 West Wilson Street, Madison, Wisconsin 53703. A copy should also be sent to the Division of Hearings and Appeals, 5005 University Avenue, Suite 201, Madison, WI 53705-5400.

The appeal must also be served on the other "PARTIES IN INTEREST" named in this decision. The process for appeals to the Circuit Court is in Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53.

Given under my hand at the City of Madison,
Wisconsin, this 25th day of November, 2013

\sBrian C. Schneider
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Hearings and Appeals



State of Wisconsin \DIVISION OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

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The preceding decision was sent to the following parties on November 25, 2013.

Office of the Inspector General
Public Assistance Collection Unit
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability