STATE OF WISCONSIN
Division of Hearings and Appeals

In the Matter of

Office of the Inspector General, Petitioner

vs. DECISION

Case #: FOF - 153897

[redacted], Respondent

Pursuant to petition filed December 4, 2013, under 7 C.F.R. §273.16, to review a decision by the Office of the Inspector General to disqualify [redacted] from receiving FoodShare benefits (FS) for one year, a hearing was held on Wednesday, January 29, 2014, by telephone.

The issue for determination is whether the respondent committed an Intentional Program Violation (IPV).

PARTIES IN INTEREST:
Petitioner:

Office of the Inspector General
Department of Health Services
PO Box 309
Madison, WI 53701
By: Nadine Stankey

Respondent:
[redacted] (Did not appear)
[redacted]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
Brian C. Schneider
Division of Hearings and Appeals

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The respondent (CARES #[redacted]) is a resident of Milwaukee County who received FS benefits in Milwaukee County during the period April 24, 2010 through February 18, 2011.

2. During that period the respondent periodically made FS purchases at [redacted] Food, a small corner store that since has been disqualified as an FS vendor due to trafficking violations. The respondent was listed as homeless throughout the period.

3. [redacted] Food was disqualified for three specific bases that are tied to FS trafficking according to the USDA Food and Nutrition Services (FNS): (1) an unusual number of transactions ending in the same cents value, (2) multiple transactions made by the same purchaser in unusually short time frames, and (3) excessively large purchase transactions. The store's only cash register was through a small opening in a security window and had no price scanner. There were no shopping baskets for customers to place multiple items that would add up to large purchase amounts. The store stocked minimal amounts of groceries, and had an emphasis on snack items.

4. The respondent made purchases on her FS card that fit all three categories of trafficking. In addition, she made purchases from legitimate full-service grocery stores. Her purchases at [redacted] increased over time; by February, 2011 over half of the respondent's purchases were at [redacted].
5. On December 19, 2013, the petitioner prepared an Administrative Disqualification Hearing Notice alleging that the respondent trafficked FS.
6. The respondent failed to appear for the scheduled January 29, 2014 Intentional Program Violation (IPV) hearing and did not provide any good cause for said failure to appear.

DISCUSSION

An intentional program violation of the FoodShare program occurs when a recipient intentionally does the following:

1. makes a false or misleading statement, or misrepresents, conceals or withholds facts; or
2. commits any act that constitutes a violation of the Food Stamp Act, the Food Stamp Program Regulations, or any Wisconsin statute for the purpose of using, presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, possessing or trafficking of FoodShare benefits or QUEST cards.

FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook, §3.14.1; see also 7 C.F.R. §273.16(c) and Wis. Stat. §§49.795(2-7).

An intentional program violation can be proven by a court order, a diversion agreement entered into with the local district attorney, a waiver of a right to a hearing, or an administrative disqualification hearing, *FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook,* §3.14.1. The petitioner can disqualify only the individual found to have committed the intentional violation; it cannot disqualify the entire household. Those disqualified on grounds involving the improper transfer of FS benefits are ineligible to participate in the FoodShare program for one year for the first violation, two years for the second violation, and permanently for the third violation. Although other family members cannot be disqualified, their monthly allotments will be reduced unless they agree to make restitution within 30 days of the date that the FS program mails a written demand letter. 7 C.F.R. §273.16(b).

7 C.F.R. §273.16(e)(4) provides that the hearing shall proceed if the respondent cannot be located or fails to appear without good cause. The respondent did not appear or claim a good cause reason for not attending the hearing. Therefore, I must determine whether the respondent committed an IPV based solely on the evidence that the petitioner presented at hearing.

In order for the petitioner to establish that an FS recipient has committed an IPV, it has the burden to prove two separate elements by clear and convincing evidence. The recipient must have: 1) committed; and 2) intended to

commit a program violation per 7 C.F.R. §273.16(e)(6). In *Kuehn v. Kuehn*, 11 Wis.2d 15 (1959), the court held that:

> Defined in terms of quantity of proof, reasonable certitude or reasonable certainty in ordinary civil cases may be attained by or be based on a mere or fair preponderance of the evidence. Such certainty need not necessarily exclude the probability that the contrary conclusion may be true. In fraud cases it has been stated the preponderance of the evidence should be clear and satisfactory to indicate or sustain a greater degree of certitude. Such degree of certitude has also been defined as being produced by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Such evidence, however, need not eliminate a reasonable doubt that the alternative or opposite conclusion may be true. …

Kuehn, 11 Wis.2d at 26.

Wisconsin Jury Instruction – Civil 205 is also instructive. It provides:

> Clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence is evidence which when weighed against that opposed to it clearly has more convincing power. It is evidence which satisfies and convinces you that "yes" should be the answer because of its greater weight and clear convincing power. "Reasonable certainty" means that you are persuaded based upon a rational consideration of the evidence. Absolute certainty is not required, but a guess is not enough to meet the burden of proof. This burden of proof is known as the "middle burden." The evidence required to meet this burden of proof must be more convincing than merely the greater weight of the credible evidence but may be less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, the *McCormick* treatise states that "it has been persuasively suggested that [the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof] could be more simply and intelligibly translated to the jury if they were instructed that they must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is highly probable." 2 *McCormick on Evidence* §340 (John W. Strong gen. ed., 4th ed. 1992).

Thus, in order to find that an IPV was committed, the trier of fact must derive from the evidence, a firm conviction as to the existence of each of the two elements even though there may exist a reasonable doubt that the opposite is true.

In order to prove the second element, i.e., intention, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient intended to commit the IPV. The question of intent is generally one to be determined by the trier of fact. *State v. Lossman*, 118 Wis.2d 526 (1984). There is a general rule that a person is presumed to know and intend the probable and natural consequences of his or her own voluntary words or acts. See *John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck*, 208 Wis. 650 (1932); 31A C.J.S. Evidence §131. Intention is a subjective state of mind to be determined upon all the facts. *Lecus v. American Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston*, 81 Wis.2d 183 (1977). Thus, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient knew that the act or omission was a violation of the FS Program but committed the violation anyway.

This is not a clear cut situation because there is no first hand evidence that the respondent engaged in trafficking, i.e. no witnesses saw her do so and neither she nor the [redacted] Food storekeeper admitted to the charges (at least entirely; the storekeeper's version changed over time). However, it is inferred that the FNS did substantial research on trafficking activity and actions associated with trafficking. [redacted] Food was disqualified as an FS vendor for taking part in trafficking activities, and the respondent clearly took part in activities identified as trafficking. As noted in the findings, not only did the respondent fit the trafficking profile, but other actions also focus on the likelihood that she used her FS card for trafficking at [redacted] Food. She was able to make use of larger, less expensive stores. Her purchases at [redacted] increased, suggesting that she became more brazen about using the store. On February 14, 2011, she had a $79.98 purchase followed up by two smaller purchases at [redacted],

and it is difficult to fathom why a homeless person could carry or store almost $90 in food in one day. Such a pattern makes no sense unless the respondent was utilizing [redacted] for reasons other than purchasing food items.

Finally, the respondent did not appear for this hearing, from which I draw an adverse inference as to her possible culpability. She has provided the Department with no credible explanation for her conduct. I conclude, therefore, that the respondent committed, and intended to commit, an FS IPV.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The respondent violated, and intended to violate, the FS program rule specifying that a recipient shall not traffic FS.
2. The violation specified in Conclusion of Law No. 1 is the first such violation committed by the respondent.

NOW, THEREFORE, it is **ORDERED**

That the petitioner's determination is sustained, and that the petitioner may make a finding that the respondent committed a first IPV of the FoodShare program and disqualify the respondent from the program for one year, effective the first month following the date of receipt of this decision.

REQUEST FOR A REHEARING ON GROUNDS OF GOOD CAUSE FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR

In instances where the good cause for failure to appear is based upon a showing of non-receipt of the hearing notice, the respondent has 30 days after the date of the written notice of the hearing decision to claim good cause for failure to appear. See 7 C.F.R. sec. 273.16(e)(4). Such a claim should be in writing to the Division of Hearings and Appeals, P.O. Box 7875, Madison, WI 53707-7875.

APPEAL TO COURT

You may also appeal this decision to Circuit Court in the county where you live. Appeals must be served and filed with the appropriate court no more than 30 days after the date of this hearing decision (or 30 days after a denial of rehearing, if you ask for one).

For purposes of appeal to Circuit Court, the Petitioner in this matter is the Department of Health Services. After filing the appeal with the appropriate court, it must be served on the Secretary of that Department, either personally or by certified mail, no more than 30 days after the date of this hearing decision. The address of the Department is: 1 West Wilson Street, Room 651, Madison, WI 53703. A copy should also be sent to the Division of Hearings and Appeals, 5005 University Avenue, Suite 201, Madison, WI 53705-5400.

The appeal must also be served on the other "PARTIES IN INTEREST" named in this decision. The process for appeals to the Circuit Court is in Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 225.53.

Given under my hand at the City of Madison, Wisconsin, this 10th day of February, 2014

_____

\sBrian C. Schneider
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Hearings and Appeals

c: Office of the Inspector General - email
Public Assistance Collection Unit - email
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability - email

State of Wisconsin\DIVISION OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

Brian Hayes, Administrator
Suite 201
5005 University Avenue
Madison, WI 53705-5400

Telephone: (608) 266-3096
FAX: (608) 264-9885
email: DHAmail@wisconsin.gov
Internet: http://dha.state.wi.us

The preceding decision was sent to the following parties on February 10, 2014.

Office of the Inspector General
Public Assistance Collection Unit
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability