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[REDACTED]

**STATE OF WISCONSIN  
Division of Hearings and Appeals**

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In the Matter of

Milwaukee Enrollment Services, Petitioner  
v.  
[REDACTED] Respondent

DECISION  
FOF/159419

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**PRELIMINARY RECITALS**

Pursuant to a petition filed July 29, 2014, under Wis. Admin. Code §HA 3.03, and see, 7 C.F.R. § 273.16, to review a decision by the Milwaukee Enrollment Services to disqualify [REDACTED] from receiving FoodShare benefits (FS) for a period of one year, a hearing was held on September 18, 2014, at Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

The issue for determination is whether the respondent committed an Intentional Program Violation (IPV).

There appeared at that time and place the following persons:

**PARTIES IN INTEREST:**

Petitioner:

Department of Health Services  
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability  
1 West Wilson Street, Room 651  
Madison, Wisconsin 53703

By: Belinda Bridges, HSPC Sr.  
Milwaukee Enrollment Services  
1220 W. Vliet St., Room 106  
Milwaukee, WI 53205

Respondent:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:**

Mayumi M. Ishii  
Division of Hearings and Appeals

**FINDINGS OF FACT**

1. Petitioner (CARES # [REDACTED]) is a resident of Dane County who received FoodShare benefits.

2. On September 6, 2013, the Petitioner completed and signed an on-line ACCESS application for FoodShare benefits, claiming that she had no income. (Exhibit 1, pgs. 13-28)
3. On September 12, 2014, the Petitioner submitted a letter signed by a Leah Turner from Bjorksten Bit 7, indicating that her internship ended effective August 30, 2013. (Exhibit 1, pg. 35)
4. On September 16, 2014, the agency sent the Petitioner a notice indicating that she would receive FoodShare benefits in the amount of \$438.00 for September 2013 and October 2013 going forward, she would receive \$526.00 per month in benefits. The notice further advised that this allotment determination was based upon a household income of zero. (Exhibit 1, pgs. 36-39)
5. On February 17, 2014, the agency sent Petitioner a notice indicating that her FoodShare benefits would be ending effective March 1, 2014, because she did not complete a Six Month Report Form. (Exhibit 1, pgs. 41-44)
6. The Petitioner continued to work for the employer named above and regularly received bi-weekly paychecks from August 30, 2014 through May 23, 2014. (Exhibit 2, pgs. 31-50)
7. On August 5, 2014, Milwaukee Enrollment Services (the agency) sent the Petitioner an Administrative Disqualification Hearing Notice, advising her that the agency was seeking to disqualify her from the FoodShare program for a period of one-year based upon an allegation that she provided false information. (Exhibit 1, pg. 1)
8. The agency did not receive any returned mail. (Testimony of Ms. Bridges)

## DISCUSSION

### *Respondent's Non-appearance*

The Respondent did not appear for this hearing. This circumstance is governed by the regulation in 7 C.F.R. §273.16(e)(4), which states in part:

If the household member or its representative cannot be located or fails to appear at a hearing initiated by the State agency without good cause, the hearing shall be conducted without the household member being represented. *Even though the household member is not represented, the hearing official is required to carefully consider the evidence and determine if intentional Program violation was committed based on clear and convincing evidence.* If the household member is found to have committed an intentional program violation but a hearing official later determines that the household member or representative had good cause for not appearing, the previous decision shall no longer remain valid and the State agency shall conduct a new hearing. The hearing official who originally ruled on the case may conduct a new hearing. In instances where the good cause for failure to appear is based upon a showing of nonreceipt of the hearing notice, the household member has 30 days after the date of the written notice of the hearing decision to claim good cause for failure to appear. In all other instances, *the household member has 10 days from the date of the scheduled hearing to present reasons indicating a good cause for failure to appear. A hearing official must enter the good cause decision into the record.*

*Emphasis added*

The hearing in this case took place on September 18, 2014. The Respondent was advised of the date and time of the hearing, in an Administrative Disqualification Hearing Notice that was sent to her at 3933 School Road. Ms. Bridges indicated that this was the Respondent's last known mailing address and that the agency did not receive any returned mail.

The Respondent did not appear at the hearing and the Respondent did not contact the Division of Hearings and Appeals within 10 days to explain her failure to appear. As such, it is found that the Respondent did not have good cause for her non-appearance.

### *The Merits of OIG's Claim*

An IPV is defined at 7 C.F.R. §273.16(c) as intentionally: making a false or misleading statement or misrepresenting; concealing or withholding facts; or committing any act that constitutes a violation of the Food Stamp Act, federal regulations or any Wisconsin statute relating to the use, presentation, transfer, acquisition, receipt or possession of food stamp coupons or an authorization to participate (ATP) card.

The Department's written policy restates federal law, below:

#### **3.14.1 IPV Disqualification**

7 CFR 273.16

A person commits an Intentional Program Violation (IPV) when s/he intentionally:

1. makes a false or misleading statement, or misrepresents, conceals or withholds facts; or
2. commits any act that constitutes a violation of the Food Stamp Act, the Food Stamp Program Regulations, or any Wisconsin statute for the purpose of using, presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, possessing or trafficking of FoodShare benefits or QUEST cards.

An IPV may be determined by the following means:

1. Federal, state, or local court order,
2. Administrative Disqualification Hearing (ADH) decision,
3. Pre-charge or pretrial diversion agreement initiated by a local district attorney and signed by the FoodShare recipient in accordance with federal requirements, or
4. Waiver of the right to an ADH signed by the FoodShare recipient in accordance with federal requirements.

*FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook, §3.14.1.*

The agency may disqualify only the individual who either has been found to have committed the IPV or has signed a waiver or consent agreement, and not the entire household. If disqualified, an individual will be ineligible to participate in the FS program for one year for the first violation, two years for the second violation, and permanently for the third violation. However, any remaining household members must agree to make restitution within 30 days of the date of mailing a written demand letter, or their monthly allotment will be reduced. 7 C.F.R. §273.16(b).

In order for the agency to establish that an FS recipient has committed an IPV, it has the burden to prove two separate elements by clear and convincing evidence. The recipient must have: 1) committed; and 2) intended to commit an intentional program violation per 7 C.F.R. §273.16(e)(6).

"Clear and convincing evidence" is an intermediate standard of proof which is more than the "preponderance of the evidence" used in most civil cases and less than the "beyond a reasonable doubt"

standard used in criminal cases. It is used in civil cases where a higher standard is required because the outcome could result in

In Kuehn v. Kuehn, 11 Wis.2d 15, 26 (1959), the court held that:

Defined in terms of quantity of proof, reasonable certitude or reasonable certainty in ordinary civil cases may be attained by or be based on a mere or fair preponderance of the evidence. Such certainty need not necessarily exclude the probability that the contrary conclusion may be true. In fraud cases it has been stated the preponderance of the evidence should be clear and satisfactory to indicate or sustain a greater degree of certitude. Such degree of certitude has also been defined as being produced by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Such evidence, however, need not eliminate a reasonable doubt that the alternative or opposite conclusion may be true. In criminal cases, while not normally stated in terms of preponderance, the necessary certitude is universally stated as being beyond a reasonable doubt.

*Wisconsin Jury Instruction – Civil 205* is also instructive. It provides:

Clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence is evidence which when weighed against that opposed to it clearly has more convincing power. It is evidence which satisfies and convinces you that “yes” should be the answer because of its greater weight and clear convincing power. “Reasonable certainty” means that you are persuaded based upon a rational consideration of the evidence. Absolute certainty is not required, but a guess is not enough to meet the burden of proof. This burden of proof is known as the “middle burden.” The evidence required to meet this burden of proof must be more convincing than merely the greater weight of the credible evidence but may be less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, the *McCormick* treatise states that “it has been persuasively suggested that [the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof] could be more simply and intelligibly translated to the jury if they were instructed that they must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is highly probable.” 2 *McCormick on Evidence* § 340 (John W. Strong gen. ed., 4<sup>th</sup> ed. 1992).

Thus, in order to find that an IPV was committed, the trier of fact must derive from the evidence, a firm conviction as to the existence of each of the two elements even though there may exist a reasonable doubt that the opposite is true.

In the case at hand, Milwaukee Enrollment Services has established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Respondent provided false information in her September 2013 ACCESS application when she stated that she did not have any income and that she provided a letter that incorrectly indicated that she stopped working for her employer on August 30, 2014. (See Exhibits 1 and 2) Indeed, Petitioner’s paystubs clearly establish that she never actually stopped working for her employer and had regular income.

There is a general rule that a person is presumed to know and intend the probable and natural consequences of his or her own voluntary words or acts. See John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck, 208 Wis. 650 (1932); 31A C.J.S. Evidence §131. Intention is a subjective state of mind to be determined upon all the facts. Lecus v. American Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston, 81 Wis.2d 183 (1977). There is nothing in the record to rebut the presumption that the Respondent intentionally provided false information on her ACCESS application.

**CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

The Respondent committed an intentional program violation (IPV) by providing false information on her ACCESS application regarding her income.

**THEREFORE, it is**

**ORDERED**

That the IPV for case number [REDACTED] is sustained and that the Respondent is hereby ineligible to participate in the FoodShare program for a period of one year, effective the first month following the date of receipt of this decision.

**REQUEST FOR A REHEARING**

This is a final administrative decision. If you think this decision is based on a serious mistake in the facts or the law, you may request a rehearing. You may also ask for a rehearing if you have found new evidence which would change the decision. Your request must explain what mistake the Administrative Law Judge made and why it is important or you must describe your new evidence and tell why you did not have it at your first hearing. If you do not explain these things, your request will have to be denied.

To ask for a rehearing, send a written request to the Division of Hearings and Appeals, P.O. Box 7875, Madison, WI 53707-7875. Send a copy of your request to the other people named in this decision as "PARTIES IN INTEREST." Your request for a rehearing must be received no later than 20 days after the date of the decision. See also, 7 C.F.R. sec. 273.16(e)(4) for the specific time limits for claiming good cause for missing the scheduled hearing. Late requests cannot be granted.

The process for asking for a rehearing is in Wis. Stat. § 227.49. A copy of the statutes can be found at your local library or courthouse.

**APPEAL TO COURT**

You may also appeal this decision to Circuit Court in the county where you live. Appeals must be served and filed with the appropriate court no more than 30 days after the date of this hearing decision (or 30 days after a denial of rehearing, if you ask for one).

For purposes of appeal to circuit court, the Respondent in this matter is the Department of Health Services. After filing the appeal with the appropriate court, it must be served on the Secretary of that Department, either personally or by certified mail. The address of the Department is: 1 West Wilson Street, Room 651, Madison, Wisconsin 53703. A copy should also be sent to the Division of Hearings and Appeals, 5005 University Avenue, Suite 201, Madison, WI 53705-5400.

The appeal must also be served on the other "PARTIES IN INTEREST" named in this decision. The process for appeals to the Circuit Court is in Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53.

Given under my hand at the City of Milwaukee,  
Wisconsin, this 10th day of October, 2014.

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\sMayumi M. Ishii  
Administrative Law Judge  
Division of Hearings and Appeals



**State of Wisconsin\DIVISION OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS**

Brian Hayes, Administrator  
Suite 201  
5005 University Avenue  
Madison, WI 53705-5400

Telephone: (608) 266-3096  
FAX: (608) 264-9885  
email: [DHAmail@wisconsin.gov](mailto:DHAmail@wisconsin.gov)  
Internet: <http://dha.state.wi.us>

The preceding decision was sent to the following parties on October 10, 2014.

Milwaukee Enrollment Services  
Public Assistance Collection Unit  
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability  
[Pamela.Hazley@dhs.wisconsin.gov](mailto:Pamela.Hazley@dhs.wisconsin.gov)