



**STATE OF WISCONSIN**  
**Division of Hearings and Appeals**

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In the Matter of

Office of the Inspector General, Petitioner

vs.

DECISION

Case #: FOF - 160655

██████████ Respondent

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The issue for determination is whether the respondent committed an Intentional Program Violation (IPV).

There appeared at that time the following persons:

**PARTIES IN INTEREST:**

Petitioner:

Representative: Nadine Stanke, Card Trafficking Agent

Office of the Inspector General  
Department of Health Services - OIG  
PO Box 309  
Madison, WI 53701

Respondent:

██████████  
██████████  
████████████████████

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:**

Mayumi Ishii  
Division of Hearings and Appeals

**FINDINGS OF FACT**

1. The respondent (CARES # ██████████) is a resident of ██████████ County.
2. On an unspecified date, the Respondent posted a message on Facebook: "Who got some food stamps for sale". (Exhibit 5)
3. On September 23, 2014, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued to the Respondent an Administrative Disqualification Hearing Notice, alleging that on an unspecified date, she attempted to traffic FoodShare benefits on-line. (Exhibit 1)

## DISCUSSION

### *Respondent's Non-appearance*

The Respondent did not appear for this hearing. This circumstance is governed by the regulation in 7 C.F.R. §273.16(e)(4), which states in part:

If the household member or its representative cannot be located or fails to appear at a hearing initiated by the State agency without good cause, the hearing shall be conducted without the household member being represented. *Even though the household member is not represented, the hearing official is required to carefully consider the evidence and determine if intentional Program violation was committed based on clear and convincing evidence.* If the household member is found to have committed an intentional program violation but a hearing official later determines that the household member or representative had good cause for not appearing, the previous decision shall no longer remain valid and the State agency shall conduct a new hearing. The hearing official who originally ruled on the case may conduct a new hearing. In instances where the good cause for failure to appear is based upon a showing of nonreceipt of the hearing notice, the household member has 30 days after the date of the written notice of the hearing decision to claim good cause for failure to appear. In all other instances, *the household member has 10 days from the date of the scheduled hearing to present reasons indicating a good cause for failure to appear. A hearing official must enter the good cause decision into the record.*

*Emphasis added*

The hearing in this case took place on November 4, 2013. The Respondent was advised of the date and time of the hearing, in an Administrative Disqualification Hearing Notice that was sent to her at [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]. Ms. Stankey indicated that this was the Respondent's last known address and that OIG did not receive any returned mail.

The Respondent did not provide a number where she could be reached, so an unsuccessful attempt was made to contact her at [REDACTED], which Ms. Stankey indicated was the Respondent's last known phone number. A voicemail message was left for the Respondent to contact the Division of Hearings and Appeals if she had good cause for her failure to be available for the hearing. The hearing was then conducted in the Respondent's absence.

The Respondent did not contact the Division of Hearings and Appeals within 10 day of the hearing. Accordingly, it is found that the Respondent did not have good cause for her failure to appear.

### *The Merits of OIG's Claim*

An intentional program violation of the FoodShare program occurs when a recipient intentionally does the following:

1. makes a false or misleading statement, or misrepresents, conceals or withholds facts;  
or
2. commits any act that constitutes a violation of the Food Stamp Act, the Food Stamp Program Regulations, or any Wisconsin statute for the purpose of using, presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, possessing or trafficking of FoodShare benefits or QUEST cards.

*FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook*, § 3.14.1; *see also* 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(c) and Wis. Stat. §§ 946.92(2).

An intentional program violation can be proven by a court order, a diversion agreement entered into with the local district attorney, a waiver of a right to a hearing, or an administrative disqualification hearing, *FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook*, § 3.14.1. The petitioner can disqualify only the individual found to have committed the

intentional violation; it cannot disqualify the entire household. Those disqualified on grounds involving the improper transfer of FS benefits are ineligible to participate in the FoodShare program for one year for the first violation, two years for the second violation, and permanently for the third violation. Although other family members cannot be disqualified, their monthly allotments will be reduced unless they agree to make restitution within 30 days of the date that the FS program mails a written demand letter. 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(b).

In order for the petitioner to establish that an FS recipient has committed an IPV, it has the burden to prove two separate elements by clear and convincing evidence. The recipient must have: 1) committed; and 2) intended to commit a program violation per 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(6). In *Kuehn v. Kuehn*, 11 Wis.2d 15 (1959), the court held that:

Defined in terms of quantity of proof, reasonable certitude or reasonable certainty in ordinary civil cases may be attained by or be based on a mere or fair preponderance of the evidence. Such certainty need not necessarily exclude the probability that the contrary conclusion may be true. In fraud cases it has been stated the preponderance of the evidence should be clear and satisfactory to indicate or sustain a greater degree of certitude. Such degree of certitude has also been defined as being produced by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Such evidence, however, need not eliminate a reasonable doubt that the alternative or opposite conclusion may be true. ...

*Kuehn*, 11 Wis.2d at 26.

*Wisconsin Jury Instruction – Civil 205* is also instructive. It provides:

Clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence is evidence which when weighed against that opposed to it clearly has more convincing power. It is evidence which satisfies and convinces you that “yes” should be the answer because of its greater weight and clear convincing power. “Reasonable certainty” means that you are persuaded based upon a rational consideration of the evidence. Absolute certainty is not required, but a guess is not enough to meet the burden of proof. This burden of proof is known as the “middle burden.” The evidence required to meet this burden of proof must be more convincing than merely the greater weight of the credible evidence but may be less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, the *McCormick* treatise states that “it has been persuasively suggested that [the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof] could be more simply and intelligibly translated to the jury if they were instructed that they must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is highly probable.” 2 *McCormick on Evidence* § 340 (John W. Strong gen. ed., 4<sup>th</sup> ed. 1992).

Thus, in order to find that an IPV was committed, the trier of fact must derive from the evidence, a firm conviction as to the existence of each of the two elements even though there may exist a reasonable doubt that it is true.

This case deals with an allegation of trafficking. Under 7 CFR §271.2, trafficking means:

- (1) The buying, selling, stealing, or otherwise effecting an exchange of SNAP benefits issued and accessed via Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards, card numbers and personal identification numbers (PINs), or by manual voucher and signature, for cash or consideration other than eligible food, either directly, indirectly, in complicity or collusion with others, or acting alone;
- (2) The exchange of firearms, ammunition, explosives, or controlled substances, as defined in section 802 of title 21, United States Code, for SNAP benefits;

- (3) Purchasing a product with SNAP benefits that has a container requiring a return deposit with the intent of obtaining cash by discarding the product and returning the container for the deposit amount;
- (4) Purchasing a product with SNAP benefits with the intent of obtaining cash or consideration other than eligible food by reselling the product, and subsequently intentionally reselling the product purchased with SNAP benefits in exchange for cash or consideration other than eligible food; or
- (5) Intentionally purchasing products originally purchased with SNAP benefits in exchange for cash or consideration other than eligible food.
- (6) Attempting to buy, sell, steal, or otherwise affect an exchange of SNAP benefits issued and accessed via Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards, card numbers and personal identification numbers (PINs), or by manual voucher and signatures, for cash or consideration other than eligible food, either directly, indirectly, in complicity or collusion with others, or acting alone.

This definition became effective November 19, 2013.<sup>1</sup> The previous definition of trafficking did not include attempted trafficking.

More specifically, OIG alleges that the Respondent attempted to traffic FoodShare benefits, based upon an undated Facebook post, “Who got some stamps for sale” that is only marked “42 minutes ago”<sup>2</sup>.

Without a clear date stamp, there is no way to know whether the post was created after the November 19, 2013 amendment to the trafficking statute.

Even assuming arguendo that the post was created after November 19, 2013, there is insufficient evidence to show that the single Facebook post meets the legal standards for proving an attempt to buy/sell foodstamps.

The Federal Registrar addressing the amendment to the trafficking definition indicates that “attempt” consists of the “intent to do an act, an overt action beyond mere preparation, and the failure to complete the act.” Fed. Register Vol. 79, No. 162, pg. 51655<sup>3</sup> The Federal Registrar specifically used the word “attempt” because, it did not want state agencies to, “take action based on what people are thinking and not what they are doing.” Id. This is consistent with the standards for establishing attempt promulgated by the Wisconsin legislature, the Wisconsin courts and the Federal courts.

Wis. Stats. §939.32(3) states that, “An attempt to commit a crime requires that the actor have an intent to perform acts and attain a result which, if accomplished, would constitute such crime and that the actor does acts toward the commission of the crime which demonstrate unequivocally, under all the circumstances, that the actor formed that intent and would commit the crime except for the intervention of another person or some other extraneous factor.”

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals in State v. Henthorn, 281 Wis.2d 526, 518 N.W.2d 544 (Wis. App. 1998) restated the holding by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Hamiel v. State, 92 Wis.2d 656, 666, 285 N.W.2d, that,

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/08/21/2013-20245/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-trafficking-controls-and-fraud-investigations>

<sup>2</sup> It is not clear why an investigator from OIG did not engage the Respondent in further discussions, to see if she would take further steps to purchase benefits or why OIG would not have used Facebook posts as opportunities to set up controlled buys.

<sup>3</sup> See <https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/08/21/2013-20245/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-trafficking-controls-and-fraud-investigations#h-13>

“[I]t must ... be shown that: (1) the defendant's actions in furtherance of the crime clearly demonstrate, under the circumstances that he [or she] had the requisite intent to commit the crime ...; and (2) that having formed such intent the defendant had taken sufficient steps in furtherance of the crime so that it was improbable that he [or she] would have voluntarily terminated his [or her] participation in the commission of the crime.”

The Federal Courts have dealt with establishing standards for determining when one has attempted to violate the law, as follows:

“As was true at common law, the mere intent to violate a federal criminal statute is not punishable as an attempt unless it is also accompanied by significant conduct...Not only does the word ‘attempt’ as used in common parlance connote action rather than mere intent, but more importantly, as used in the law for centuries, it encompasses both the overt act and intent elements.” U.S. v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S.102, 127 S.Ct. 782, 107 (2007)

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals<sup>4</sup> in U.S. v. Sanchez, 615 F.3d 836, 843 and 844 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2010) followed this standard, stating that one must not only show an intent to violate the law, but also that the defendant took a substantial step toward completing the crime. The Court of Appeals further stated that, “a substantial step is ‘some overt act adapted to, approximating, and which in the ordinary and likely course of things will result in, the commission of the particular crime’...and that it is ‘something more than mere preparation, but less than the last act necessary before the actual commission of the substantive crime’...The line between mere preparation is inherently fact specific; conduct that would appear to mere preparation in one case might qualify as a substantial step in another.”<sup>5</sup>

It is difficult to conclude that a single, undated post saying, “Who got some food stamps for sale” is clear and convincing evidence of both an intent to sell food stamps and an overt act beyond mere preparation to commit the offense. That one post does not make it so highly probable, that in the normal course of things, the Respondent would have purchased food stamps. Indeed, the post could have been merely an inquiry into the availability of food stamps, rather than a serious intent to purchase food stamps, and anything could have happened after the post, including withdrawal from the offense, or absolutely nothing could have happened. Again, OIG has no evidence of any other acts by the Respondent in furtherance of food stamp trafficking.

Based upon the record before me, I find that that OIG has not met its burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Respondent intentionally violated the FoodShare program rules.

### **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

OIG has not shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Respondent attempted to traffic FoodShare benefits.

**NOW, THEREFORE, it is ORDERED**

That claim number [REDACTED] is hereby reversed and that OIG cease enforcement efforts.

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<sup>4</sup> Wisconsin is in the 7<sup>th</sup> Federal Judicial Circuit and as such, holdings from the 7<sup>th</sup> Circuit Court of Appeals are binding.

<sup>5</sup> The Court of Appeals cited to *United States v. Manley*, 632 F.2d 978, 988 (2d Cir. 1980), *United States v. Rovetuso*, 768 F.2d 809, 821 (7th Cir.1985), *United States v. Barnes*, 230 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir.2000) and *United States v. Magana*, 118 F.3d 1173, 1199 (7th Cir.1997).

**REQUEST FOR A REHEARING ON GROUNDS OF GOOD CAUSE FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR**

In instances where the good cause for failure to appear is based upon a showing of non-receipt of the hearing notice, the respondent has 30 days after the date of the written notice of the hearing decision to claim good cause for failure to appear. See 7 C.F.R. sec. 273.16(e)(4). Such a claim should be made in writing to the Division of Hearings and Appeals, P.O. Box 7875, Madison, WI 53707-7875.

**APPEAL TO COURT**

You may also appeal this decision to Circuit Court in the county where you live. Appeals must be filed with the Court **and** served either personally or by certified mail on the Secretary of the Department of Health Services, 1 West Wilson Street, Room 651, Madison, WI 53703, **and** on those identified in this decision as “PARTIES IN INTEREST” **no more than 30 days after the date of this decision** or 30 days after a denial of a timely rehearing request (if you request one).

The process for Circuit Court Appeals may be found at Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53. A copy of the statutes may be found online or at your local library or courthouse.

Given under my hand at the City of Milwaukee,  
Wisconsin, this 17th day of November, 2014.

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\sMayumi Ishii  
Administrative Law Judge  
Division of Hearings and Appeals

- c: Office of the Inspector General - email
- Public Assistance Collection Unit - email
- Division of Health Care Access and Accountability - email
- Nadine Stankey - email



**State of Wisconsin\DIVISION OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS**

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The preceding decision was sent to the following parties on November 17, 2014.

Office of the Inspector General  
Public Assistance Collection Unit  
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability  
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