STATE OF WISCONSIN
Division of Hearings and Appeals

In the Matter of

Waukesha County Health and Human Services, Petitioner

vs.

DECISION
Case #: FOF - 160825

Redact, Respondent

Pursuant to petition filed September 24, 2014, under Wis. Admin. Code §HA 3.03, and 7 C.F.R. § 273.16, to review a decision by Waukesha County Health and Human Services to disqualify Redact from receiving FoodShare benefits (FS) for one year, a hearing was held on Tuesday, November 4, 2014 at 01:00 PM, at Waukesha, Wisconsin.

The issue for determination is whether the respondent committed an Intentional Program Violation (IPV).

There appeared at that time the following persons:

PARTIES IN INTEREST:
Petitioner:

Waukesha County Health and Human Services
514 Riverview Avenue
Waukesha, WI 53188

Respondent:
Redact
Redact

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
Peter McCombs (telephonically)
Division of Hearings and Appeals

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The respondent (CARES # Redact) is a resident of Waukesha County who received FS benefits in Waukesha County from at least September 1, 2011 through May 31, 2014.
2. The respondent lives with her child and her boyfriend, JY, the father of her child.

3. The respondent submitted an online Six Month Report Form (SMRF) on December 3, 2010, identifying her address on Redact in Greenfield, Wisconsin, and indicating that only she and her daughter resided at that address. The same address and household information was submitted on SMRF's/renewals completed October, 2011, April, 2012, October 2012, and April, 2013.
4. On July 16, 2011, JY submitted a FS application claiming the same address as respondent's address, and reporting only himself in the household. The same address and household information was submitted on SMRF's/renewals/applications completed December, 2011, June, 2012, and January, 2013.
5. JY reported residing at the Redact residence to Child Support, according to the online KIDS website.
6. Wisconsin Circuit Court Access website indicates that both respondent and JY have reported the Redact residence.
7. On September 25, 2014, the petitioner prepared an Administrative Disqualification Hearing Notice alleging that respondent failed to provide accurate household composition information.

DISCUSSION

An intentional program violation of the FoodShare program occurs when a recipient intentionally does the following:

1. makes a false or misleading statement, or misrepresents, conceals or withholds facts; or
2. commits any act that constitutes a violation of the Food Stamp Act, the Food Stamp Program Regulations, or any Wisconsin statute for the purpose of using, presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, possessing or trafficking of FoodShare benefits or QUEST cards.

FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook, § 3.14.1; *see also* 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(c) and Wis. Stat. §§ 946.92(2).

An intentional program violation can be proven by a court order, a diversion agreement entered into with the local district attorney, a waiver of a right to a hearing, or an administrative disqualification hearing, *FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook,* § 3.14.1. The petitioner can disqualify only the individual found to have committed the intentional violation; it cannot disqualify the entire household. Those disqualified on grounds involving the improper transfer of FS benefits are ineligible to participate in the FoodShare program for one year for the first violation, two years for the second violation, and permanently for the third violation. Although other family members cannot be disqualified, their monthly allotments will be reduced unless they agree to make restitution within 30 days of the date that the FS program mails a written demand letter. 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(b).

In order for the petitioner to establish that an FS recipient has committed an IPV, it has the burden to prove two separate elements by clear and convincing evidence. The recipient must have: 1) committed; and 2) intended to commit a program violation per 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(6). In *Kuehn v. Kuehn*, 11 Wis.2d 15 (1959), the court held that:

> Defined in terms of quantity of proof, reasonable certitude or reasonable certainty in ordinary civil cases may be attained by or be based on a mere or fair preponderance of the evidence. Such certainty need not necessarily exclude the probability that the contrary conclusion may be true. In fraud cases it has been stated the preponderance of the evidence should be clear and satisfactory to indicate or sustain a greater degree of certitude. Such degree of certitude has also been defined as being produced by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Such evidence, however, need not eliminate a reasonable doubt that the alternative or opposite conclusion may be true. …

Kuehn, 11 Wis.2d at 26.

Wisconsin Jury Instruction – Civil 205 is also instructive. It provides:

> Clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence is evidence which when weighed against that opposed to it clearly has more convincing power. It is evidence which satisfies and convinces you that "yes" should be the answer because of its greater weight and clear convincing power. "Reasonable certainty" means that you are persuaded based upon a rational consideration of the evidence. Absolute certainty is not required, but a guess is not enough to meet the burden of proof. This burden of proof is known as the "middle burden." The evidence required to meet this burden of proof must be more convincing than merely the greater weight of the credible evidence but may be less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, the *McCormick* treatise states that "it has been persuasively suggested that [the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof] could be more simply and intelligibly translated to the jury if they were instructed that they must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is highly probable." 2 *McCormick on Evidence* § 340 (John W. Strong gen. ed., 4th ed. 1992.

Thus, in order to find that an IPV was committed, the trier of fact must derive from the evidence a firm conviction as to the existence of each of the two elements even though there may be a reasonable doubt as to their existence.

In order to prove the second element, i.e., intention, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient intended to commit the IPV. The question of intent is generally one to be determined by the trier of fact. *State v. Lossman*, 118 Wis.2d 526 (1984). There is a general rule that a person is presumed to know and intend the probable and natural consequences of his or her own voluntary words or acts. *See*, *John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck*, 208 Wis. 650 (1932); 31A C.J.S. Evidence §131. Intention is a subjective state of mind to be determined upon all the facts. *Lecus v. American Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston*, 81 Wis.2d 183 (1977). Thus, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient knew that the act or omission was a violation of the FS Program but committed the violation anyway.

The petitioner has established that an IPV has been committed, but I find that the respondent has successfully rebutted the assertion that the IPV was committed with intent. Both the respondent and JY appeared at hearing and testified that they never intended to commit an IPV. The respondent testified that she had always provided petitioner with information that she understood to be correct, and that her on-again-off-again relationship with JY had given rise to an FS overpayment and these IPV allegations. The respondent explained that her relationship status with JY was up in the air often enough that she never considered that the information that was provided was inaccurate. I found her testimony to be credible and corroborated by the evidence on record.

Based upon the record before me, I find that the petitioner has not established by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent intentionally violated the FoodShare program's rules, and its decision must be reversed.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

For the reasons discussed above, there is no clear and convincing evidence that the respondent intended to commit an IPV.

NOW, THEREFORE, it is **ORDERED**

That the petitioner's determination of an intentional program violation is reversed, and the petition for review is dismissed.

REQUEST FOR A REHEARING ON GROUNDS OF GOOD CAUSE FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR

In instances where the good cause for failure to appear is based upon a showing of non-receipt of the hearing notice, the respondent has 30 days after the date of the written notice of the hearing decision to claim good cause for failure to appear. See 7 C.F.R. sec. 273.16(e)(4). Such a claim should be made in writing to the Division of Hearings and Appeals, P.O. Box 7875, Madison, WI 53707-7875.

APPEAL TO COURT

You may also appeal this decision to Circuit Court in the county where you live. Appeals must be filed with the Court **and** served either personally or by certified mail on the Secretary of the Department of Health Services, 1 West Wilson Street, Room 651, Madison, WI 53703, **and** on those identified in this decision as "PARTIES IN INTEREST" **no more than 30 days after the date of this decision** or 30 days after a denial of a timely rehearing request (if you request one).

The process for Circuit Court Appeals may be found at Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53. A copy of the statutes may be found online or at your local library or courthouse.

Given under my hand at the City of Madison, Wisconsin, this 5th day of December, 2014.

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\sPeter McCombs
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Hearings and Appeals

c: Moraine Lakes Consortium - email
Public Assistance Collection Unit - email
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability - email
Pamela Hazley - email

State of Wisconsin\DIVISION OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

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The preceding decision was sent to the following parties on December 5, 2014.

Waukesha County Health and Human Services
Public Assistance Collection Unit
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability
Pamela.Hazley@dhs.wisconsin.gov