



**STATE OF WISCONSIN**  
**Division of Hearings and Appeals**

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In the Matter of

Marinette County Department of Human Services, Petitioner

vs.

██████████, Respondent

DECISION

Case #: FOF - 164255

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Pursuant to petition filed February 26, 2015, under Wis. Admin. Code §HA 3.03, and 7 C.F.R. § 273.16, to review a decision by the Marinette County Department of Human Services to disqualify ██████████ ██████████ from receiving FoodShare benefits (FS) one year, a hearing was held on Wednesday, April 15, 2015 at 09:00 AM at Marinette, Wisconsin.

The issue for determination is whether the respondent committed an Intentional Program Violation (IPV).

**PARTIES IN INTEREST:**

Petitioner:

Marinette County Department of Human Services  
Wisconsin Job Center Suite B  
1605 University Drive  
Marinette, WI 54143

Respondent:

██████████ (no appearance)

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:**

Peter McCombs (telephonically)  
Division of Hearings and Appeals

**FINDINGS OF FACT**

1. The respondent (CARES # ██████████) is a resident of Marinette County who received FS benefits in Adams County from October 1, 2013 through October 1, 2013.
2. The respondent was incarcerated in Brown County from January 18, 2014, through August 25, 2014.
3. Respondent's FS card was utilized 6 times in June, 2014, while the respondent was incarcerated.

4. On April 20, 2015, the petitioner prepared an Administrative Disqualification Hearing Notice alleging that the respondent allowed the use of his FS card while he was incarcerated.
5. The respondent failed to appear for the scheduled April 15, 2015 Intentional Program Violation (IPV) hearing and did not provide any good cause for said failure to appear.

### DISCUSSION

An intentional program violation of the FoodShare program occurs when a recipient intentionally does the following:

1. makes a false or misleading statement, or misrepresents, conceals or withholds facts;  
or
2. commits any act that constitutes a violation of the Food Stamp Act, the Food Stamp Program Regulations, or any Wisconsin statute for the purpose of using, presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, possessing or trafficking of FoodShare benefits or QUEST cards.

*FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook*, § 3.14.1; *see also* 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(c) and Wis. Stat. §§ 946.92(2).

An intentional program violation can be proven by a court order, a diversion agreement entered into with the local district attorney, a waiver of a right to a hearing, or an administrative disqualification hearing, *FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook*, § 3.14.1. The petitioner can disqualify only the individual found to have committed the intentional violation; it cannot disqualify the entire household. Those disqualified on grounds involving the improper transfer of FS benefits are ineligible to participate in the FoodShare program for one year for the first violation, two years for the second violation, and permanently for the third violation. Although other family members cannot be disqualified, their monthly allotments will be reduced unless they agree to make restitution within 30 days of the date that the FS program mails a written demand letter. 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(b).

7 C.F.R. §273.16(e)(4) provides that the hearing shall proceed if the respondent cannot be located or fails to appear without good cause. The respondent did not appear or claim a good cause reason for not attending the hearing. Therefore, I must determine whether the respondent committed an IPV based solely on the evidence that the petitioner presented at hearing.

In order for the petitioner to establish that an FS recipient has committed an IPV, it has the burden to prove two separate elements by clear and convincing evidence. The recipient must have: 1) committed; and 2) intended to commit a program violation per 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(6). In *Kuehn v. Kuehn*, 11 Wis.2d 15 (1959), the court held that:

Defined in terms of quantity of proof, reasonable certitude or reasonable certainty in ordinary civil cases may be attained by or be based on a mere or fair preponderance of the evidence. Such certainty need not necessarily exclude the probability that the contrary conclusion may be true. In fraud cases it has been stated the preponderance of the evidence should be clear and satisfactory to indicate or sustain a greater degree of certitude. Such degree of certitude has also been defined as being produced by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Such evidence, however, need not eliminate a reasonable doubt that the alternative or opposite conclusion may be true. ...

*Kuehn*, 11 Wis.2d at 26.

*Wisconsin Jury Instruction – Civil 205* is also instructive. It provides:

Clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence is evidence which when weighed against that opposed to it clearly has more convincing power. It is evidence which satisfies and convinces you that “yes” should be the answer because of its greater weight and clear convincing power.

“Reasonable certainty” means that you are persuaded based upon a rational consideration of the evidence. Absolute certainty is not required, but a guess is not enough to meet the burden of proof. This burden of proof is known as the “middle burden.” The evidence required to meet this burden of proof must be more convincing than merely the greater weight of the credible evidence but may be less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, the *McCormick* treatise states that “it has been persuasively suggested that [the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof] could be more simply and intelligibly translated to the jury if they were instructed that they must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is highly probable.” 2 *McCormick on Evidence* § 340 (John W. Strong gen. ed., 4<sup>th</sup> ed. 1992).

Thus, in order to find that an IPV was committed, the trier of fact must derive from the evidence a firm conviction as to the existence of each of the two elements even though there may be a reasonable doubt as to their existence.

In order to prove the second element, i.e., intention, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient intended to commit the IPV. The question of intent is generally one to be determined by the trier of fact. *State v. Lossman*, 118 Wis.2d 526 (1984). There is a general rule that a person is presumed to know and intend the probable and natural consequences of his or her own voluntary words or acts. See, *John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck*, 208 Wis. 650 (1932); 31A C.J.S. Evidence §131. Intention is a subjective state of mind to be determined upon all the facts. *Lecus v. American Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston*, 81 Wis.2d 183 (1977). Thus, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient knew that the act or omission was a violation of the FS Program but committed the violation anyway.

In this case, respondent did not appear at the hearing. If the person suspected of the IPV (or his or her representative) cannot be located or fails to appear without good cause the hearing must be conducted without the IPV suspect being represented. 7 C.F.R. 273.16(e)(4).

"If the household member or its representative cannot be located or fails to appear at a hearing initiated by the State agency without good cause, the hearing shall be conducted without the household member being represented. Even though the household member is not represented, the hearing official is required to carefully consider the evidence and determine if intentional Program violation was committed based on clear and convincing evidence. If the household member is found to have committed an intentional Program violation but a hearing official later determines that the household member or representative had good cause for not appearing, the previous decision shall no longer remain valid and the State agency shall conduct a new hearing. The hearing official who originally ruled on the case may conduct the new hearing. In instances where good cause for failure to appear is based upon a showing of nonreceipt of the hearing notice . . . , the household member has 30 days after the date of the written notice of the hearing decision to claim good cause for failure to appear. In all other instances, the household member has 10 days from the date of the scheduled hearing to present reasons indicating a good cause for failure to appear. A hearing official must enter the good cause decision into the record." 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(4) (2011).

The respondent did not present a good cause reason for failing to appear at the hearing. Therefore, the determination of whether respondent committed an FS IPV must be based solely on what the petitioner presented at the hearing.

The petitioner was incarcerated from January 18, 2014, through August 25, 2014. While in jail, he continued to receive FoodShare benefits, and other persons debited \$159.07 from his card. This violated at least two FoodShare rules. Residents of institutions that provide over half of their meals cannot receive FoodShare. 7 CFR §273.1(a)(7)(vi). Wisconsin FoodShare policy denies benefits to all those incarcerated for more than 30 days unless they are released under the Huber law to care for and purchase and prepare food for their families.

*FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook*, § 3.2.1.2.2. The respondent was part of one-person FoodShare household, and the record reveals no applicable Huber privileges while he was in jail. This means that he should not have even been eligible, much less able to let others to use his card. That his benefits continued is his fault and not the agency's because recipients must report a change of circumstances that affects their benefits within 10 days. 7 CFR § 273.12(a)2. In addition, Wisconsin FoodShare recipients cannot knowingly transfer food coupons "except to purchase food from a supplier..." Wis. Stat. § 49.795(4). The agency worker testified that whoever used the respondent's FS card would need his personal identification number, which that person could only receive from him. As a household of one, there is no evidence before me that would explain how someone else could have used petitioner's card without petitioner providing his PIN.

Based upon the record before me, I find that the petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent intentionally violated FS program rules, and that this violation was the first such violation committed by the respondent. Therefore, the petitioner correctly seeks to disqualify the respondent from the FS program for one year.

### **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

1. The respondent violated, and intended to violate, the FS program rule specifying that FS benefits are to be used by the FS recipient only; FS are not transferable.
2. The violation specified in Conclusion of Law No. 1 is the first such violation committed by the respondent.

**NOW, THEREFORE, it is** **ORDERED**

That the petitioner's determination is sustained, and that the petitioner may make a finding that the respondent committed a first IPV of the FoodShare program and disqualify the respondent from the program for one year, effective the first month following the date of receipt of this decision.

### **REQUEST FOR A REHEARING ON GROUNDS OF GOOD CAUSE FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR**

In instances where the good cause for failure to appear is based upon a showing of non-receipt of the hearing notice, the respondent has 30 days after the date of the written notice of the hearing decision to claim good cause for failure to appear. See 7 C.F.R. sec. 273.16(e)(4). Such a claim should be made in writing to the Division of Hearings and Appeals, P.O. Box 7875, Madison, WI 53707-7875.

### **APPEAL TO COURT**

You may also appeal this decision to Circuit Court in the county where you live. Appeals must be filed with the Court **and** served either personally or by certified mail on the Secretary of the Department of Health Services, 1 West Wilson Street, Room 651, Madison, WI 53703, **and** on those identified in this decision as "PARTIES IN INTEREST" **no more than 30 days after the date of this decision** or 30 days after a denial of a timely rehearing request (if you request one).

The process for Circuit Court Appeals may be found at Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53. A copy of the statutes may be found online or at your local library or courthouse.

Given under my hand at the City of Madison,  
Wisconsin, this 27th day of April, 2015

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\sPeter McCombs  
Administrative Law Judge  
Division of Hearings and Appeals

c: Bay Lake Consortium - email  
Public Assistance Collection Unit - email  
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability - email  
Sandra Waugus - email



## State of Wisconsin\DIVISION OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

Brian Hayes, Administrator  
Suite 201  
5005 University Avenue  
Madison, WI 53705-5400

Telephone: (608) 266-3096  
FAX: (608) 264-9885  
email: [DHAMail@wisconsin.gov](mailto:DHAMail@wisconsin.gov)  
Internet: <http://dha.state.wi.us>

The preceding decision was sent to the following parties on April 27, 2015.

Marinette County Department of Human Services  
Public Assistance Collection Unit  
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability  
[swaugus@marinettecounty.com](mailto:swaugus@marinettecounty.com)